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Title: How the military competes for expenditure in brazilian democracy: arguments for an outlier
Authors: Rezende, Flávio da Cunha
Zaverucha, Jorge
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: International Political Science Association
Citation: ZAVERUCHA, J.; REZENDE, F. . How the Military Competes for Expenditure in Brazilian Democracy: Arguments for an outlier. International Political Science Review, v. 30, p. 407-429, 2009.
metadata.dc.relation.ispartof: International Political Science Review. Camberra, International Political Science Association, 2009
Abstract: Comparative analysts argue that democracies spend less on military policies than authoritarian states, a claim that was applied to Brazilian electoral democracy by Hunter (1997). In fact, Brazil behaves as an outlier and military spending has continued to increase since 1995. Our explanation for this behavior relies on the idea of internal political governability risks faced by Brazilian presidents. They are continually threatened by leftist groups that have fragile commitments to liberal democracies and they rely on the military to strategically protect them.
Appears in Collections:NEPEAC - Artigos

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